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Abstract 
VVe provide an introduction to a theory of coordination mechanism design and show 
how to apply it to an assignment problem. The purpose is to introduce those familiar 
with organizational computing, but unfamiliar with game theory and economics, to the 
subject. We also describe briefly how we can test new mechanisms before taking them 
into the field. Finally, we raise some unresolved research questions. 
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I begin with two examples of organizational design problems that I hope will expose 
some issues of importance to those interested in coordination. The examples are highly 
abstracted from two research problems we have been studying. 
Problem #1: 
You have just bought a. firm with :3 divisions, each with its own unique management 
problem. Further, you have chosen :3 individuals of very different talents to be managers 
for you and have promised them they can share in the profits generated by the division 
they manage. Now you must decide who is to manage which division. Each manager best 
knows their own ability to . .  genernte .profits in each .cLivision . .  an.d . .  no ,one .else, including 
you, has that information. You want to assign them so that the total profits of the firm 
are maximized. You could let them each choose which division they want to manage. 
But what do you do if several choose the same one? Do you flip a. coin? You might 
*This paper relies heavily on the results fron1 an ongoing research project \vith fvfark Olson and David 
Porter funded by the Flight Projects Office of the .Jct Propulsion La.boratory (l'J1\S,A�) through a grant to 
the Progra.111 on Organizational Design (PrOD) at c:a}tech. None of then1 is responsible for any errors. 
form a committee of the 3 and let them vote on an appropriate assignment. Bnt how do 
you prevent them from wasting a lot of time in these non-productive meetings? Can you 
provide a computer a1gorithm that will solve your coordination problem? 
Problem #2: 
You have been hired by the people of a sma11 island as a consultant. For years the 
King of the island has decided who gets what and how much. But everyone, including 
the King, is tired of the politica.l favoritism and the time spent lobbying to protect one's 
interests. They are also not sure that the goods are getting to those who really can use 
them. Ea.ch thinks they deserve more. They have already considered assigning everyone 
an equal share of the resources but rejected that process. Equal allocations a.re not 
desirable if some islanders hate bananas and others hate coconuts. In a. world where 
different people have different tastes, everyone can be made better off with some trading. 
An a.dditiona1 problem you face is that those who ha.ve been especia1ly favored over the 
yea.rs have claimed they will go to war rather than accept a new system that leaves them 
significantly worse off. The islanders are widely dispersed and rarely see each other but 
they can ship goods. They a.re technically advanced and have a system of networked 
persona.I computers. They do not ha.ve money nor do they want any: they have made it 
constitutiona1ly illegal. Cm1 you design an algorithm to solve their problem? 
If someone had all the requisite knowledge, access to infinite computing capabilities, 
and the power to require actions, they could easily solve these problems. The first is an 
example of an assignment problem: a simple integer programming problem. The diffi­
culty, as we will see in more detail below, is to get the potential managers to correctly 
provide the necessary information on their abilities. This is called th e incentive compati­
bility problem . The second problem is more complex. Even if the information on desired 
trades is available, computing the a.ppropria.1.e shipping plans, deciding who sends what 
commodity t.o whom, can be a, major combinatoric problem that. takes too much time t.o 
solve given the islanders computing technology. 1 call this the com.putational complexity 
problem . Finally, even if one can acquire the informa.tion and calculate a desirable solu­
tion, one must st.ill make sure everyone is willing t.o complete the required trades. The 
islanders must be willing to participate. T call this the political viability probl em . 
Mechanism. design, populated mostly by game-theorists and economists, and organi­
zationa.l computing, populated mostly by computer scientists a.nd group psychologists, 
have developed independently to tackle ·coordination prnblems. Mechanism design has 
matured over the past 20 years by focusing on incentive compatibility and political viabil­
ity. The analysis has usually been carried out under the working assumption that infinite 
computing capacity is always available. Any computation required of the individuals or 
of the system can be instantaneously and correctly corn pleted. Of course, any expert in 
orga.11iza.tion_a.l con1pt1ting kno\VS this is clearly \\'ro11g. For the n1ost pa.rt, organizational 
computing, including decision support and group support systems, has matured by fo-
2 
cusing on the potential information processing ca.pa.bilities of computer systems. The 
a.na.lysis ha.s usually been carried out under the working assumption tha.t individuals will
voluntarily provide a.II <la.ta a.nd ta.ke a.ll actions required by the system. People will a.ct 
like computer algorithm subroutines. Of course, a.ny expert in mechanism design knows 
this is clearly wrong. It is time to integrate the two research programs so tha.t the full 
reality of the issues a.re confronted in a sensible wa.y. 
This paper is intended a.s a.n introduction to the field of mechanism design a.nd its 
potential for a.pplica.tion to problems of interest in organiza.tiona.l computing. The theory 
ha.s become highly developed, the a.pplica.tions are wide ranging, a.nd there a.re wa.ys 
to use economics experiments to provide proof of concept. I will describe some recent 
ha.sic research results, discuss some recent organiza.tiona.l design applications for which 
we have found these techniques useful, a.nd then I will list some open research problems 
tha.t require expertise in organizational computing. 
1 An Example of Mechanism Design
Let us return to problem #1. It is one example of a class known as assignment problems. 
These a.re organization problems that arise when a fixed number of heterogeneous objects, 
(such as offices, personal computers, secretaries, or starting times a.t a. golf course) must 
be allocated (usually on a. one to one basis) to a fixed number of potential users. Ea.ch user 
values these items differently and only that <mer knows for sure what these values really 
a.re. 1 The organization problem is to provide a mechanism to determine the allocation 
in a way that maximizes the organization's goals. Let V;j be the profits that manager i
thinks will occur if she manages division i. Assume that her profits will be independent. 
of how the others a.re assigned. Let :r;j equal 1 if i is assigned to manage j. Let X;j be 0
ot.herwise.2 Problem #1 is to choose va.lues of .1";., , for i = 1, . . .  , I and j = 1, ... , J with
r1, = ni = :3, to n1axin1ize 
I J 




Lxij < j=l 
1 /\n alternative \:vay to think about this is that ea.ch user kno\vs the value to the organization from 
inatching up that user vvith any particular unit. and only that user kno\vS this. The key is that inforn1ation 
about the value to the organization of any assign1nent is dispersed. 
2 Another possibility is to let :i:ij be any nun1ber bet\veen 0 and 1 and to interpret it as the probability
of assigning i to j. ''1e also use this approach in this paper.
and Xij E {O, l} for all i,j.
Remember, however, only i knows the true value of Vij so you need to acquire that 
information before solving this problem. But i will share in the profits of only her 
division and so she does not necessarily wa.nt to solve your problem. Instead she wants 
to maximize "Lf=1 VijXij subject to "Lf=1 xDl. To see why this creates a problem let
us consider four mechanisms that someone who has not thought much about it might 
suggest. 
Mechanism A: Th e obvious algorithm 
This mechanism is straight-forward and based on the assumption that people will 
provide all information requested. A computer programmer is hired to provide an algo­
rithm for solving the assignment problem as stated a.bove. The only data required by 
the program a.re the values of v, = (vii, . . .  , Vi.J) which are known to ea.chi. After the
program is written you simply ask each manager i to provide values of Vi to the computer. 
You then run the algorithm, check the result, and assign i to j if and only if Xij = 1 in the 
solution. vVha.t would you do if you were individual i? The answer is easy. You would 
first figure out for what j the value of vi.i is largest.. Let's say v;1 is the largest value. 
You now know that you want to be assignee! to division 1. How do you accomplish this? 
You simply make sure that your r eport ed value of v;1 is larger than any other j's report
a.bout Vj1 and that your r eported values or "l'ij, for j > L are less than any other's reports 
about their respective values.3 (You claim exce1)tional expertise in managing division 1 
a.nd predict huge losses if you are placed in charge of divisions 2 or :3.) Is this a problem?
Not if each individual manager is indeed particularly suited to the management of one 
and only one division and that division is different for ea.ch manager. But if abilities are 
not so specific and differentiated or if some divisions a.re simply more difficult to manage 
and produce lower profits no matter who is the manager then this mechanism will not 
necessarily produce the a.ssignrnent that maximizes the organization's profits. The naive 
assumption that each manager will report the true va.lue of her v; will lead to sub-optimal 
results. For example, suppose the profits that will ocrnr to three divisions under each of 
three ina.11a.gers are as -follo1vs: 
clivisior1 rna.nager 1 manager 2 n1a.na.ger '.) 
a 100 GO 7.5 
b 200 50 100 
c .so 10 10 
30ne inight argue that this type of behavior \vill be found out \Vhen the next profit report is due and,
with a serious enough penalty1 could be prevent.ed. But i t  is easy Lo rnodify this exan1ple slightly and 
1nore realistically to have profits be jointly clet.er111ined by the inanager and son1e exogenous , ranclon11 
forces. In this case the 1nanager \vho reports too high a capability can clain1 that. the lovver than 
expected profits \\'ere due to bad luck and not. to her ability. 'Ihis \vill not \Vork in the long-run but can 
be successful in the short-run. 'fhere are plenty of obvious exan1pl�s. 
There a.re 6 possible assignments. The optimal assignment is to place 1 in charge of 
b, 3 in charge of a, and 2 in charge of c. We denote this by (3,1,2). It yields a. profit of 
285. Only manager 2 knows the entries in column 2. If the other two a.re honest and non­
ma.nipula.tive, 2 can become the manager of division b by reporting values of 10 for a, 210 
for b, and 0 for c. The algorithm will then choose (1,2,:3) thinking profits will be 320 but 
they will, instead, be 160. Note that both 1 and :3, as well as the organization, have lost 
by 2's maneuver. Of course 1 a.nd ;3 can and will retaliate. If there is an upper bound on 
possible reports, say H, and a lower bound on reports, say. L, then..in equilibrium 1 and 
3 will claim to be able to generate profits of H if they are assigned to division b a.nd L if 
assigned to a or c. 2 will claim H for division a and L for Ii and c. The algorithm will 
assign 2 to a but will have to randomly assign 1 and :3. The profits will be either 270 or 
210, with an expected value of 2110, which is 84 3 of the optimal profits of 285. 
Ca.n we do better? 
Mechanism B: Th e committ e e  
Suppose we let these managers meet a.s a committee and choose the assignment them­
selves. Suppose in addition we require only a simple majority, 2 in the case of three 
divisions, to be in favor of an assignment to adopt it. vVha.t ca.n we expect to happen? 
Remember a.gain that only ea.ch manager knows her own likely profits. Look a.t the 3 
division example above. There a.re 6 possible assignments but only one of them has the 
property that there is no alternative which a majority prefers. The assignment that will 
be chosen gives division a to 2, b to :3 and c to 1. Both 2 and :3 will vote in favor of this 
over a.ny other suggestion. It yields a profit of only 210. Majority rule has a1located the 
best manager to her worst alternative. The obvious algorithm is better since at lea.st half 
the time it yields a. higher valued assignment. Profits using the committee a.re barely 
above the minimum of 175. 
Is there a.ny other possibility'? 
Mechanism C: The lott ery 
A lottery is a. mechanism that is sometimes used to allocate dormitory rooms and 
rock concert tickets. Individual names a.re drawn at random a.ncl then allowed to select 
their first choice from the alternatives tha.t a.re yet unassigned. How would that work 
here? If manager l .. is.selected .. first she .. chooses .. div..i.sion . .b .. JLrna.nager3 is selected second, 
she would choose division a. Ma.na.ger 2 then has no choice and is assigned to division 
c. Since the order chosen is random, we can only calculate the expected profits. There
a.re 6 possible draws. :3 yield 210,, 2 yield 270,, and 1 yields the optimum of 285. The 
expected profits are thus 24:3. For these parameters,, the lottery a.lwa.ys does at lea.st a.s 
well as majority rule and beats it ha.If the time. For these para.meters it is also just a. 
little better than the obvious algorithm since it beats it 1/6 of the time by selecting the 
optimal assignment instead of one valued at 270. I3ut, different parameters yield different 
rankings. For example suppose the profits for manager 2 in division a are 100 (instead 
of 60). Then, the obvious mechanism is better since it yields a payoff ha.If the time of 
310 and half the time of 2.50 for an expected profit of 280. The lottery yields, for these 
new parameters, 310 for 2 of 6 times, 250 for 2 of 6 times, 28.5 for 1 of 6 times a.nd 210 
for 1 of 6 times. The expected payoff is :269. 
What might an economist say? 
Mechanism D: Marketlike m echanisms 
Another mechanism that is sometirnes considered is one that tries to mimic the mar­
ketplace. It gives a number of tokens to each manager and then lets them use those 
to bid for an assignment to a particular division. For the assignment problem in which 
each manager only gets one division, these ma.rketlike mechanisms are equivalent to the 
obvious algorithm when reports are limited4 to being between L and H. In equilibrium, 
purposive agents will always bid all of their tokens on their most preferred division and 
zero on the others. This is no dif erent than reporting H for the most preferred slot and 
L for all others. 
At this point we could continue to think up mechanisms and evaluate their perfor­
mance, hoping to find the best one. But there are an infinite number of possibilities, 
some of which only replicate the perforrna1ice of others, and a finite amount of time. 
We also have to find some way to clea.l with the fact that our evaluation of the three 
mechanisms has depended on knowing the true values of u. In pra.ctice the designer may 
only know that the entries in the matrix are bounded between m. and �M. How should 
we then evaluate the possibilities? The discipline of mechanism design addresses these 
issues by providing a systematic a.pproach to organizational design problems. It provides 
a mathematics of organization design which allows us to analyze structures and to predict 
performance. Let us turn to that formal framework next. 
2 An abstract approach to mechanism design5 
An abstract description of what is studied in the modern theory of mechanism design 
includes a) the set of environm ents , denoted by E with elements e, which describes the 
problem and the range of possible parameter values including, if necessary, the structure 
4If there is no lin1it on credible reports then there "'ill be no equilibriurn for the obvious algorithm. 
Each 1nana. \Vill try to choose the largest integer and report that. as the potential profits for their 
1nost preferred division. T'l1ere is, of course, no largest integer. 
5This section and the next are son1e\vhat abstract. but provide the theoretical foundations for the 
111ore applied discussions later on. The non-n1a.then1atical reader can jurnp to Section 4 \vith only a 
small loss in the train of thought. 
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of knowledge and beliefs about the likelihood of any pa.rticular environment, b) the set 
of outcomes, denoted by X with elements a:, the choices that the mechanism is to make, 
c) the m echanism , denoted (NI,g) where 111 is the language of communication with
the managers and g is the rule g( m) = x which determines what outcome is selected 
depending on what the managers communicate,6 and cl) the b ehavior, denoted b (e,g) = 
m, a prediction about what the individuals in the organization will do in each environment 
when confronted with a new mechanism. 
The mechanism tells us what is to be clone if individuals report m. g can include very 
complicated iterative processes as well as very simple one report versions. The behavior 
rule tells us how these reports will occur if the mechanism is g and the true environment 
is e. b can include behavior which is independent of other's actions or it ca,n describe the 
equilibrium of some complicated sequentia,J game. The pe,1jormanc e  of the mechanism in 
the environment e is then the composition of the design and behavior or g(b(e,g)). 
How is this to be evaluated? Generally there is an evaluation function, U(x, e) which 
tells the designer how to value particular outcomes from the organizationa1 point of view 
in each environment. In our assignment problem U(v, a: ) was the profits yielded for the
true va1ues v when the assignment is x. The performance of (M,g) in e given the behavior 
bis evaluated as U(g(b(e,g)), e). But different mechanisms may be better in different e. 
The natura1 Bayesian approach is to adopt prior beliefs about the probability of any e in 
E represented by a cumulative distribution !'unction F(e), and rank mechanisms by the 
expected va1uation, J U(g(b(e,g)), e)dF(c). 
To summarize, modern mechanism design takes E, X, b, U, and F as given and 
tries to describe and characterize the solutions to the problem: choose (NI, g) to maxi­
mize JU (g( b ( e, g)), e )dF( e) subject to the constraints clue to individual behavior (called
incentive compatibility), the constraints clue to cornputationa1 limitations (called com­
putational complexity) and constraints clue to the fact that, genera.lly, new organizations 
which replace old ones will be unsuccessful unless c\·eryone is better off (called political 
compatibility). 
Formally, the designer's problem is to 
choose (J1!l,g) to maximize U(2:(e),e)dF(e) subject to 
6In our exa1nple of the allocation of rnanagers to divisions, the environn1ent included the 1natrix of 
profits, the fact that each n1a.nager only kne'v the values in her O\Yn colun1n in that n1atrix1 and the 
bounds on profits, IJ and £; the ou tco1ne \Vas an assignrnent: t.he obvious a.lgorithn1 as a n1echanism is








[that is, x(e) = g(b( e,g)) for all e in E], 
[that is, g ca.n be computed for all m], and 
[that is, v;(g( b( e)),e) > vi(g0(b(e), e) for all i and 
e in _/'!; \;i,rbere vi is i's o\v11 evaluation of t11e out­
comes x rn e and g0 is the mechanism to be re­
placed.] 
The obvious problems in putting this into practice are ( 1) what is the full set of feasible 
mechanisms (M,g), (2) what is the right behavior model b, (:3) what are computational 
co1n1)atible inechanis111s, and ( 4) can \VC clescrn)e the set of po]iticaily vial) le mechanisms
in a more operationally satisfactory manner? 
3 W hat is The Set of All Incentive Compatible Mech­
anisms? 
A very helpful shortcut has been developed which allows us to begin to get a handle 
on the set of incentive compatible mechanisms, those that satisfy (A). It does not allow 
us to describe all of them but it does give us a.11 upper bound 011 the possibilities for 
performance. This short-cut relies 011 some game-theoretic l'rinciples of behavior and is 
known as th e r ev elation principle.' It states: 
Given the appropriate behavior and given full information processrng and 
computing capabilities, the performance of any mechanism can be replicated 
by a direct inc entiv e compatible meclrnnism. 
A direct mechanism is one in which all individuals simply report their information 
about the environment and g picks one J: for each reported e. An incentive compatible 
direct mechanism is one in which each individual finds it in their own interest to report the 
truth. That is, b( e, g) = e for all e. The revelation principle then provides that given band 
any mechanism (Ai, g) with performa.nce g( b( e, g) ), there exists a direct rnecha.nism (E, h) 
such that e = b(e,h) and h( e) = g( b (e, g)) for all e)n E. A plausibilitj' argument goes as
follows. If behavior is purposive then b( e, g) will ha,·e the property that each individual 
is responding as best as is possible for Lhem gi l'Cn the private information they have. 
Now consider the following direct mechanism: have each agent report her information to 
the designer and have the designer then compute the strategy, for that individual, using 
the original mechanism. If the inclivichrnl incorrectly reports the information then the 
7Standard references include [l], [2], and ['.J]. 
designer will compute something other than what was originally the best for the true 
situation. So it is in the interest of the agent to report honestly: the direct mechanism 
h( e) = g( b( e, g ) ) is incentive compatible and obviously duplicates the performance of g 
given b. 
Using the revelation principle, we can restate the design problem as: 
choose (E, h) to 
maximize f U(h(e), e)dF(e) 
subject to 
A) e = b(e,h) for all e in E
B) computa.t.ional compatibility and
C) political compatibility.
VVith this device we have significantly narrowed tlw domain over which we must 
search for the desired coordination mechanism. ln fact for ma.ny problems, such as 
the assignment problem, we have converted our search into an analytic and solvable 
maximization problem. But we have clone so at the cost of ignoring some potential 
frictions. If the set of direct mechanisms includes sonw which are not computational 
compatible then our shortcut will ni le them out even though there may have been some 
less direct computational compatible mechanisms which would have yielded the same 
outcom.e. So if we impose cornputatiorrnl compatibility in our problem, after using the 
revelation principle, we may miss desirable mechanisms. Second, in stating the revelation 
principle we assumed that ''the appropriate behavior and foll information processing 
and computing capabilities" were present. This really requires purposive game-theoretic 
agents who act as if they have extremely general and effective computing capabilities. It 
is really an open empirical question as to when this is valid. 'vVe discuss the empirical 
issues below in Section 5. 
Now that we have some of the theoretical foundations displayed let us return to our 
example, Problem #1, and sec what these principles Id us do. 
4 The Assignment Problem - Theory 
We have discovered in the last two sections tha.t, under the appropriate empirical condi­
tions on individual behavior, we can systematically search for a best mechanism to solve 
the assignment of managers to divisions by narrowing our domain of search without loss 
of generality. In particular, if the assignment algorithm can be solved for all possible 
matrices of \raJues, tl1e11 tl1e solutio11 to T_)rob1cn1 #1 is equivalent to 
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l. solve the optimal a.ssigument problem for the range of possible profit ma.trices using
the obvious algorithm with some additional constraints, called incentive compati­
bility conditions, which insure that each manager will report correctly,
2. ask each manager to report the values for her column of the matrix and
3. assign the managers a.ccorcling to tlw solution \;o (1).
The theory establishes that the best mechanism possible (given the incentive, com­
putational, and political constraints on the designer) will be found this way. Fonnally 




. i=l J=I 
J 
'I:,;r;J(i') =I !"or all u. 
J=l 
I 
L .T;;( v) = l for all 1'. 
·i=] 
and "Lf=1 v;jXi_i(v) ::0: "Lf=1 V;jl'iJ(v/w;) for all v, w; where (v/w;) replaces v; with w;. 
The last inequalities are the incentive compatibility constraints.8 The mechanism is then 
simply: ask each manag·er i for her v; and choose the assignment ;r ( v ) .  This still leaves
us a difficult maximization problem lo solve but we can use more theory. In particular, 
Mark Olson9 has found that 
Theo r em (Olson) For the assignment problem, .r ( v ) satisfies the incentive compatibil­
ity constraints if and only if x depends at most on the ordinal properties of v. 
That is, any incentive compatible mechanism need only, indeed can only, ask the 
managers, i, for a ranking of the profits expected from each division, j. This means 
that the obvious algorithm and the ma.rketlike mechanism are not incentive compatible, 
which we already knew from our analysis in Section 1. However they are, as the revela­
tion principle states, .equi:valenLto another incentive .compatible direct.mechanism. The 
lottery, on the other hand, is incentive compatible since it is equivalent to asking each 
manager for a ranking and then selecting one at a time, randomly, and assigning each to 
8T·hese constraints require, in the language of gan1e theory, that the true value of Vi be a don1inant 
strategy response to the request for inforn1atio11. 'rhat is, n1anager i n1ust. \va.nt to respond \vith the 
truth no ina.tter l.vhat the other n1anagC'rs report 
9See [4]. 
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their top ranked aiternative from those divisions remaining.10,11 Using Olson's result we 
can eliminate the best inequalities in our problem and look only at :r(v) that depend on
rankings of Vi. 
5 Proof-of-concept or How can We be Sure? 
How can we be sure of a design based only on theoretical analysis? One way is to create 
an organizational design test-bed similar in spirit to the methods aircraft designers use 
with their wind tunnels and navel architects with their towing tanks. At Caltech, our 
organization design test bed is the Experimental Economics Laboratory. This is not the 
place for an extensive description of experimental economics methodology, but perhaps 
I can give you enough an introduction to pique your interest.12 
What is important to understand is that econornic experinients are a cross between 
fea,sibility studies, using simulated participants or real subjects (does the software work?),
and very complicated field studies. The key aspect is that we can control the incentives 
of the participants in the laboratory through the technique of value inducement (see [8] ) ,  
we can control the structure and timing ol' inl'orrnation that participants have about the 
environment in the laboratory and we can control the mechanism. In the field only the 
mechanism is directly controllable: in feasibility studies no attempL is made to control in­
centives. A bonus we get from control is that we can rnea.snre p<?rformance characteristics 
that can not be measured directly in the field. 
How does this work. Let rne illustrate with the assignment problem. Subjects are 
recruited to participate in an economic experiment. testing an organization design for 
the assignment problem, in which they are paid based on their clecisions13 
Each subject is given a description of the generic group decision problem, in this case 
that I subjects are to be allocated to J slots. Each subject is also given a description 
of what that subject will be paid, in dollars, at thee encl of the experiment, for each 
possible outcome of the group decision process. For example subject 1 may be told she 
will be paid $10 if she is assigned to slot. l., $20 is she is assigned to slot 2 and $1 if 
100Ison and others call this the Serial Dictator n1echa.nisn1 for obvious reasons. 
11The con1111ittee is also incentive con1patible if for the true env ironn1ent, there is a single assign1nent 
"\vhich a inajority,prefurs t:0 a.H·-ot1i-1'€'1'b�'(a c0ndorcet :\v·i-1u1er").·"0liher,vise;-· i ll'eentive co1npa.tibility n1ay be
absent. 
12T\vo recent books on the subject are 'I'he J-lanclbook of Expcrin1ental Econon1ics edited by .J .l{agel 
and A. R,oth for Princeton 1Jn iversity Press [5] (to a.ppear soon) and I�xperin1ental Economics by Davis 
and Holt [6]. For a description of this n1ethodology applied to the a.ssignn1ent problen1 consult [7]. 
13At the Caltech lab this roo1n has 20 II3i\'l con1puters linked by a. token ring. Other labs n1ay have
a different configuration of n1a.chines. In one set of experi111ent.s \Ve have ugecl ci. coller-tion of co1nput.ers 
around the globe connected through internet. 
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she is not assigned to any slot. Ea.ch subject knows only her own payoffs. In this way 
we have provided the subject with the strong financial incentive to act as if she is in an 
environment where v.;=(10,20) and the status quo - relevant for political viability -
is 1. We now can confront the collection of subjects with different mechanisms and see 
what happens. Usually a number of trials are completed with the same subjects, payoffs, 
and mechanism to make sure the results are rea.sona.bly stable. 
It is important to recognize two key advanta.ges of this methodology: (1) w_e ha.vejhe 
right model of the human participant and (2) we can measure such things as the values 
obtained. The first is important because studies tha.t use robots (simulated humans) 
to compute behavior in group systems a.re then highly dependent on getting that model 
right. The second is important because we can then compare coordination mechanism on 
grounds other than ease of use, speed of interaction, etc. In particular we can measure 
how well the mechanism actually performs in achieving the goals set for it. For the 
assignment problem, as it was originally stated, the goal was to maximize the sum of 
the values to the individuals of the final assignment. Since we, as experimenters, have 
chosen those values a.nd know the fina.l assignrnent we can exactly measure the value of 
that assignment. In field studies or in lab studies where the subjects are not paid on the 
ha.sis of the outcomes, there is absoh1tely no way to clo that. 
Two disadvantages of this methodology are ( l) it is expensive and (2) we may be
missing certain scale effects. The former depends on how much control the experimenter 
wants. Paying subjects $2000 and $1000 instead of $20 and $10 certainly increases the 
likelihood that their induced valuations are indeed their true valuations for the experi­
ment. Paying them $.02 and $.01, instead, wonld lea.cl to the likelihood that they would 
react in this environment to other incentives that we cannot. measure or, even, identify. 
The latter problem occurs even in engineering studies nsing wind tunnels and towing 
tanks. There is no guarantee that an America. US Cup racing sailboat design that per­
forms at a, very high level in the tank. where the model is I /10 sea.le, will not just capsize
when built to full scale. 
One measure of particular interest to mechanism designers is efficiency; tha.t is, the 
valuation achieved by a. mechanism relative to the maximum achievable. The total value 
received measures the a.mount of the benefits tlrn decision process has created to be 
distributed. Efficiency measures how much of the maximum benefits have been discovered 
by the mechanism. So all other things being equal we would want to design mechanism 
which produce high efficiencies. The problem, of course, is that there is no reason to 
expect the efficiency of a mechanism to he constant across environments. So to be 
sure a.bout the relative performance one mus\ check it. out under a number of possible 
situations. Let us look at one study that did this for the assignment problem. 
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1 in two very different environments called the high contention environment and the 
12 
low contention environment. The difference in the two environments was the degree 
to which several a.gents wanted to be assigned to the same slot. If each agent's most 
preferred slot was different from all the others', there is 0 contention. If a.II agents have 
exactly the same ranking for all slots, there is a. lot of contention, say 1. Olson and 
Porter used an environment with 6 slots and 6 agents with low contention, but not 0, 
and an environment with 6 slots and 8 agents with high contention, but not 1.The two 
mechanisms considered were the lottery and a marketlike mechanism. Each mechanism 
was tested in each environment using 2 .differenLwbject groups for 20 trials . .each. The 
average amount of money pa.id each subject for ,.15-60 minutes effort was around $14. 
The efficiency achieved on average during the final 15 trials in ea.ch experimental 
session, are detailed in Table I. 









What is noticeable is tha.t. the marketlike mechanism rea.lly does do better than the 
lottery in both situations. Olson and Porter do not explain why this occurs but it appears 
to be clue to the fact that the lottery allocates primarily on the basis of one's first choice 
slot while the marketlike mechanism allows those who do not get their first choice to 
sometimes get their second choice. The theory. as it stands, would not ha.ve uncovered 
this phenomenon. It remains an open question whetl1er one can find any other mechanism 
that would produce higher efficienciesH 
6 Open research issues 
Remember the research program is find a systematic methodology to solve the optima.I 
mechanism design problem: choose (M,g) to maximize total organizational benefits sub-
14If one were vvilling to a.llo\v subjects to use their 01Yn n1oney to bid for allocations (then, for exa1nple, 
someone who will be paid $20 could bid up to $18.99 and still be better off than getting no slot) , then
one can easily in1prove the efficiency of the allocations achieved. Olson and P'orter sholA' that one kind 
of auction attains .9SS1o. ..a.nd--99o/c,.,clJicie.ucies_,in J0-\\'.,and.,hig;lL.-c.ont.eJ.1Lio11 envir0:1unents. The problem with
these inechanis1ns is that the individuals do not get to distribute the higher values attained that way 
since they pay son1e of it a.v,,a.y just to get an assignn1enL Jn both e11vironn1ents they end up individually 
\Vorse off using ca.sh to bid than they do using chits to hid even though efficiency is higher with cash. In 
the high contention environ111ent the subject,s are :)QQCJ(, bet.ter off \Yhen cash is not used. T"l1e implications 
for political viability ought to be obvious. Because of the high contention the seller of the slots (in this 
case; the experin1enters) are able to con1111and very high prices and extra.ct n1ost of the benefits. In low
contention environments this is not possible and subjects co1ne out a.bout the sa.1ne \vi th or without cash. 
Re co1nn1enda.tions to sell off scarce parking places at. universities genernlly falter for these reasons. 
ject to incentive compatibility, computational compatibilit.y and political compatibility. 
There are at lea.st three issues which need more research. 
1. What mechanism g actually satisfy the constraints? \Ve saw that the revelation
principle ha.s the potential to simplify this question with respect to incentive com­
patibly. To do the same for computational compatibility seems to be a. task that
is ideally suited for those who study Organizational Computing. Involved a.re is­
sues of heuristics vs. full optimizing algorithms, mernory constraints, presentation
effects, etc.
2. \rVl1at is l)el1a.-vior b? Ts the revelation principle valid as a.n e1npirica.l issue? What
is the form of individuals have bounded computational capabilities? How does this
interact with the computational aspects of the mechanism? l-low complex must a
problem be before game theory loses its predictive ability?
3. How do we deal with political compatibility? In many cases the designer does
not know how participants value the current mechanism that is to be replaced
by the new design. Thus, a mechanism must be designed to either reveal that
information or to guide the transition 1.o a ne\\' mechanism that satisfies the political
viability constraint. Those in Orga.nizational Computing that worry about why new
and exciting GDSS and DSS systerns a.re not being adopted very rapidly should
recognize the importance of this transition problem. Old vested interests will fight
adoption unless they can be assured thev will be at least as well off as they are now.
Increases in efficiency are not sufficient to lead to new adoptions; the distribution
of those gains is as important.
There is now a framework within which to carry out our very ambitious, but exciting, 
program: to create a methodology and technology which will make the design of orga­
nizations a.s straightforward as the design of buildings. The research and applications 
are just beginning. Organizational compnting, game tlwory, and experimental economics 
will all play fundamental roles but I snspect the biggest gains will accrue to those whose 
research includes more than one of Lhesc approaches. 
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